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THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL
HISTORIES ON INDIVIDUALS AND
SOCIETIES: A REPLICATION OF
AND EXTENSION OF
BERG ET AL. (1995)
Xu Jiang, Radhika Lunawat and Brian Shapiro
ABSTRACT
We replicate and extend the social history treatment of the Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) investment game, to further document
how the reporting of financial history influences how laboratory societies
organize themselves over time. We replicate Berg et al. (1995) by con-
ducting a No History and a Financial History session to determine
whether a report summarizing the financial transactions of a previous
experimental session will significantly reduce entropy in the amounts sent
by Investors and returned by Stewards in the investment game, as Berg
et al. (1995) found. We extend Berg et al. (1995) in two ways. First, we
conduct a total of five sessions (one No History and four Financial
History sessions). Second, we introduce Shannon’s (1948) measure of
entropy from information theory to assess whether the introduction of
financial transaction history reduces the amount of dispersion in the
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amounts invested and returned across generations of players. Results
across sessions indicate that entropy declined in both the amounts sent
by Investors and the percentage returned by Stewards, but these patterns
are weaker and mixed compared to those in the Berg et al. (1995) study.
Additional research is needed to test how initial conditions, path depen-
dencies, actors’ strategic reasoning about others’ behavior, multiple ses-
sions, and communication may mediate the impact of financial history.
The study’s multiple successive Financial History sessions and entropy
measure are new to the investment game literature.
Keywords: Trust; investment; return; financial history; societal
organization; entropy
JEL classifications: C92; C65; D80; D02
Despite the proliferation of measurement and reporting practices, little is
known about their impact on society at large. The purpose of this paper is
to replicate and extend the social history treatment of the Berg, Dickhaut,
and McCabe (1995) investment game, to further document how a prevalent
public disclosure practice, the reporting of financial history, influences how
laboratory societies organize themselves over time. While the investment
game has been widely studied and replicated, the social history treatment
has not been as extensively examined (for an exception, see Ortmann,
Fitzgerald, & Boeing, 2000). We develop the idea that individuals and orga-
nizations may use information not only to draw inferences about their own
and others’ behavior, but also to restructure their environment. More speci-
fically, we hypothesize that successive generations of laboratory societies
will increasingly organize themselves over time when they receive reports of
financial transactions undertaken by the preceding generation.
Theories of how communication influences the way societies organize
themselves (e.g., Giddens, 1984; Habermas, 1979; Leydesdorff, 2001;
Luhmann, 1986) provide a basis for our hypothesis. In these theories, socie-
tal organization is an emergent property of the norm-governed behavior of
individual actors and can be mediated through various coordination and
communications systems. For example, information systems that aggregate
and publicly report the actions of individuals from a preceding generation
can help organize the actions of individuals in a successive generation if
individuals interpret the information as an indicator of the expected
96 XU JIANG ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 P
ro
fe
ss
or
 B
ria
n 
Sh
ap
iro
 A
t 0
7:
04
 2
4 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
(P
T)
behavioral norms in their society (cf. Chaudhuri, Schotter, & Sopher,
2009). In this manner, the public information that individuals use to pro-
duce and reproduce their social systems are the product of social interac-
tion among individuals in preceding generations (cf. Berg et al., 1995,
pp. 132133; Giddens, 1984; Latour, 1993).
We operationally define an increase in societal organization as a reduc-
tion in the entropy (disorder or variance) in the amounts invested and
returned by Investors and Stewards across successive generations of players
in an Investment Game setting. In an Investment Game, an Investor
receives $10 from the experimenter and then decides how much of the $10
($0$10) to send to the Steward. The amount sent to the Steward then tri-
ples ($0$30). Finally, the Steward decides how much of the tripled sum to
send back to the Investor. In our experiment, each societal generation con-
sists of a new set of Investor/Steward pairs. Following Berg et al. (1995),
we introduce financial history by providing each successive generation with
a summary of the amounts invested and returned by players in the preced-
ing generation. We replicate Berg et al. (1995) by conducting a No History
and a Financial History session in order to determine whether a report
summarizing the financial transactions of a previous experimental session
will significantly reduce entropy in the amounts sent by Investors and
returned by Stewards, as the Berg et al. (1995) study shows. We also extend
Berg et al. (1995) in two principal ways. First, in order to test our hypoth-
esis that successive generations of laboratory societies will increasingly
organize themselves when they receive a financial report of transactions
from the immediately preceding generation, we conduct a total of five ses-
sions (one No History and four Financial History sessions). Second, we
introduce Shannon’s (1948) measure of entropy from information theory to
assess whether the introduction of financial transaction history reduces
entropy (the amount of dispersion) in the distributions of amounts invested
and returned across generations of players.
The relatively simple and widely used setting of the Investment Game
has several attractive features for investigating the evolution of societal
organization. The game is played only once, Investors and Stewards are
anonymously paired, and anonymity ensures that the experimenter cannot
match the identities of specific individuals to the dollar amounts sent and
returned. These procedures control for alternative explanations of behavior
including repeated game reputation effects, contractual precommitments,
punishment threats, and experimenter demand effects (e.g., Ortmann et al.,
2000). In addition, in the Investment Game and other similar games
(e.g., the gift exchange game, the peasant-dictator game, and the
97The Impact of Financial Histories on Individuals and Societies
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moonlighting game), many players invest and return nonzero amounts,
contrary to the assumption of pure monetary self-interest (Berg et al., 1995;
Camerer & Fehr, 2002; Cox, 2004; Dickhaut & McCabe, 1997; for a meta-
analysis of the Investment Game, see Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Finally, in
the Investment Game setting, substantial variation exists across the actions
of different players (e.g., Berg et al., 1995; Johnson & Mislin, 2011;
Ortmann et al., 2000). Following Berg et al. (1995), we hypothesize that the
introduction of a financial transaction history will reduce this variation by
mediating what individuals expect of others and what others expect of
them. In addition, we extend Berg et al. (1995) by further hypothesizing
that with financial histories given to successive generations of laboratory
societies, the actions of individuals will on average converge across those
societies toward emerging norms of expected behavior.
In sum, our study attempts to replicate Berg et al.’s (1995) results and
extends the prior investment game literature in two principal ways. First, it
applies our entropy metric to the Berg et al. (1995) data. Second, it ascer-
tains whether the introduction of a financial history has an incremental
effect across multiple generations of the investment game.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section
describes the Investment Game, develops our measure of entropy, and
states our hypotheses. The subsequent two sections present the experimen-
tal method and results, respectively. The concluding section discusses the
implications of our results and identifies opportunities for future research.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Below we describe the Investment Game and develop our hypotheses about
entropy reduction and societal organization.
Investment Game Structure
The investment game is played as follows. In stage one, the subjects in
Rooms A and B are each given $10 as a show-up fee. Subjects in Room A
(Investors) are given an additional $10 and must decide how much of their
$10 to send to an anonymous counterpart in Room B. We denote this
amount by Ma. The amount sent is then tripled to 3Ma. In stage two, a
counterpart in Room B (the Steward) is given the tripled money. The
98 XU JIANG ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 P
ro
fe
ss
or
 B
ria
n 
Sh
ap
iro
 A
t 0
7:
04
 2
4 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
(P
T)
counterpart Steward must decide how much money to return, which is
denoted kb(3Ma). The Investor chooses the strategy Ma ∈ {0, 1, 2,…, 10},
while the Steward chooses the strategy:
kb : f0; 3;…; 30Þ→ f0; 1;…; 30g
which satisfies 0≤ kb 3Mað Þ≤ 3Ma:
These strategies result in the payoffs:
Pa Ma; kbð Þ= $10þ $10Mað Þ þ kb 3Mað Þ
and
Pb Ma; kbð Þ= $10þ 3Ma − kb 3Mað Þ
A subject’s initial wealth is denoted Wi. If subjects have strictly increasing
indirect utility function for wealth, given by Vi(Wi + Pi(Ma, kb)) for i = a,
b, and each subject, i, maximizes Vi(·), then Stewards have a dominant
strategy to keep all the money, that is, kb(3Ma) = 0 for all Ma. If Investors
infer their counterpart’s dominant strategy, then they should send nothing,
that is, Ma = 0. If these results obtain, societal entropy will be zero, even in
the absence of information about the actions of individuals in a preceding
laboratory society.
Hypotheses
One hypothesis for the investment game is that subjects will make decisions
consistent with the subgame perfect prediction,
N0 : Ma = 0 for all a
If for some reason Investors send a positive amount (i.e., Ma > 0), then
the dominant strategy for Stewards is as follows:
N1 : If Ma > 0; then kb 3Mað Þ= 0 for all b
Past research in the Investment Game has found, however, that some inves-
tors trust stewards and that some stewards are trustworthy (Berg et al.,
99The Impact of Financial Histories on Individuals and Societies
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 P
ro
fe
ss
or
 B
ria
n 
Sh
ap
iro
 A
t 0
7:
04
 2
4 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
(P
T)
1995; Cox, 2004; Johnson & Mislin, 2011; Ortmann et al., 2000).
Consistent with these prior results, our hypotheses for the No History con-
dition (first generation of players) in our Investment Game are as follows:
H1. Investors will send nonzero amounts to Stewards (Ma > 0 for
some “a”).
H2. Stewards who receive nonzero amounts will return nonzero amounts
to Investors (kb(3Ma) > 0 for some “b”).
Impact of Financial History
The question next arises as to how much variation exists across individual
behavior, and whether a simple information system that merely aggregates
and reports the actions of individuals from a previous generation will
reduce that variation in a successive generation. Berg et al. (1995) pre-
viously reported less variation between a No History and one subsequent
Social History session. We attempt to replicate this result as well as test our
general hypothesis that when financial histories are provided to successive
generations of laboratory societies, the actions of individuals will on aver-
age converge across those societies toward emerging norms of expected
behavior.
In our experimental setting, all generations except the first receive a
financial history of transactions made by the immediately preceding genera-
tion. Sociological research suggests that communication across generations
can significantly influence behavior in subsequent generations
(e.g., Giddens, 1984; Habermas, 1979; Leydesdorff, 2001; Luhmann, 1986;
see also Chaudhuri et al., 2009), which documented the conditions under
which intergenerational communication improves coordination in the
Minimum Effort Game setting. In addition, Lunawat (2013a, 2013b) used
the Berg et al. (1995) setting to show how communication of private finan-
cial information can enhance trust between a manager and an investor. In
our setting, a financial history summarizing the transactions of a preceding
generation may provide a basis for individuals to assess the dispositions,
intentions, and trustworthiness of players in a subsequent Investment
Game (cf. Kramer, 1999, p. 575). For example, Investors might use the
past transaction data to identify investments that are likely to yield a posi-
tive return,1 and Stewards might infer the reasonableness of the amount
invested by their Investor partners as well as the amount they are expected
to return to the Investors. Alternatively, Investors and Stewards might
more simply select amounts based on their conformity with perceived
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central tendencies in the past data, regardless of whether the central tenden-
cies are socially beneficial.
Using Entropy to Measure the Impact of Financial History
To assess the impact of financial history on players’ behavior, we measure
the change in entropy of the amounts invested and returned by Investors
and Stewards. The term entropy first arose in statistical mechanics to reflect
the status of a particle system. Decreases in entropy reflect less movement
in the particle and less uncertainty about its location. In a social setting,
the amount of entropy reflects the amount of uncertainty about individuals’
behavior. An increase in entropy means that the behavior of individuals is
more uncertain, while a decrease in entropy means that the behavior is less
uncertain or more orderly.
The entropy concept has been widely used in the engineering and infor-
mation theory literatures (e.g., see Cover & Thomas, 1991). Sims (1998,
2003, 2005) subsequently introduced Shannon’s (1948) entropy concept in
the economics literature and defined the informativeness of information sig-
nals as the change in entropy between prior and posterior distributions.
The entropy concept has been used to model price stickiness (Sims, 1998),
flexible information acquisition (Yang, 2015), and general equilibrium
(Mackowiak & Wiederholt, 2009). Following these prior studies, we use the
entropy concept to measure the amount of uncertainty about individuals’
behavior.
More formally, we define the amount of order in our laboratory societies
as follows. Let pi denote the probability of the ith element being drawn
from a distribution of n discrete outcomes. Entropy is defined by
−
P
ipilog2pi. As an example, consider a binary outcome such as the flip of
a coin. A fair coin has entropy equal to 1, and a biased coin with a 0.75
probability of heads has entropy equal to 0.81.2 The entropy metric indi-
cates that the biased coin has more order than the fair coin.3
Entropy Metric Applied to the Berg et al. (1995) Data
To illustrate how the entropy metric can be applied and to establish conti-
nuity with the prior literature, we now perform an entropy analysis of the
Berg et al. (1995) data. The Berg et al. (1995) study had two treatments,
“no history” and “social history.” The social history treatment included a
report summarizing the decisions in the no history treatment. Below, we
re-label their “social history” treatment as “financial history” to conform
101The Impact of Financial Histories on Individuals and Societies
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to the labels we use in our experiments. We compare the entropy metrics
across the Berg et al. (1995) no history and financial history treatments,
separately for the investor, steward, and joint data sets.
For the Investors, EntropyNo History = 3.141 and EntropyFinancial History =
2.876. We used a bootstrapping technique to determine whether the
observed Entropy reduction of 0.265 is statistically significant. The null
hypothesis for this test is that the amounts invested were chosen randomly.
For this and all subsequent tests reported below, we generated 10,000 mea-
sures of differences in entropy. Based on the bootstrapped distribution, the
observed reduction in entropy is significant (p < .02, one-tailed).
Since the maximum amounts returned by stewards were constrained by
the tripled amounts sent by investors, we converted the amounts returned
into percentages of the maximum amount that could be returned. Under
this measure, more trustworthy stewards returned a higher percentage.
More specifically, we analyzed the entropy in the distributions of the
amounts returned by Stewards, in deciles of percentage of amounts received
from Investors. For these Steward distributions, EntropyNo History = 3.086
and EntropyFinancial History = 2.709. A bootstrapped distribution indicates
that the observed Entropy difference of 0.377 is statistically significant (p <
.0001, one-tailed).
Finally, the Berg et al. (1995) no history and financial history data as a
whole tended to cluster on outcome pairs. We examine the joint densities
of Investor and Steward behavior to test whether the observed clustering is
statistically significant. This test must take into account that the No
History condition has a smaller sample size than the Financial History con-
dition. Ceteris paribus, smaller sample sizes yield smaller maximum levels
of entropy.4 The entropy formula for the No History condition is:
−
X
i
X
j
fi; j
32
log2
fi; j
32
where fi,j denotes the frequency in category “i, j.” For example, “3,2”
denotes 3 dollars invested and 2 returned by the steward. A similar formula
applies to the Financial History condition, with 28 possible observations.
The calculated entropies are 4.688 and 4.227 for the No History and
Financial History conditions, respectively, for an overall decrease in
entropy of 0.461 across the two conditions. Based on a bootstrapped distri-
bution of the difference in entropies across the two conditions, the 0.461
reduction in entropy is marginally significant at the .055 level (one-tailed).
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In sum, the Berg et al. (1995) data indicate that the introduction of
financial history significantly reduced entropy in the distributions of
amounts sent and amounts returned, and marginally reduced entropy in
the joint distributions. Below we attempt to replicate this result, as well as
test whether financial histories will have an incremental effect over subse-
quent generations of laboratory societies. To address the latter, we gath-
ered new data over five societal generations to test the predictive power of
our hypothesis that financial histories provide a basis for developing order
in societies. Participants in Session I (the first generation) received no finan-
cial history, whereas participants in Sessions IIV (the four subsequent
generations) received a report summarizing the financial history of the
immediately preceding session. Thus, Sessions I and II replicate the original
Berg et al. (1995) study, and Sessions IIIV extend that study.
Based on our preceding discussion of social theory and our entropy ana-
lyses of the Berg et al. (1995) data, the following hypotheses predict that
the distributions of the amounts invested, returned, and their joint distribu-
tions will exhibit more order (less entropy) across generations of players:
H3. Financial transaction histories will produce more order (less
entropy) in the Investor distributions across generations.
H4. Financial transaction histories will produce more order (less
entropy) in the Steward distributions across generations.
H5. Financial transaction histories will produce more order (less
entropy) in the joint Investor/Steward distributions across generations.
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were recruited and participated in the experimental sessions in two
groups separated by time and geography. Group 1 subjects were recruited
in October 2007 from the subject pool in the CIRANO Research Center,
Montreal, Canada. The CIRANO subject pool was comprised mostly of
undergraduate and graduate students from the universities that participated
in the research center. Due to a nondiscrimination clause governing subject
recruiting, a few Group 1 subjects were nonstudent working professionals
from the downtown Montreal area. Group 2 subjects were mostly
103The Impact of Financial Histories on Individuals and Societies
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undergraduate students recruited in February and March 2015 from the
Experimental Social Sciences Lab at the University of California  Irvine.
The same experimental procedures were administered to both subject
groups. Subjects received $10 for showing up. Subjects also could earn up
to an additional $30, depending on their decisions and the decisions of their
anonymous partner. Subjects were told to report directly to either Room A
or Room B. Room A subjects served as Investors, and Room B subjects
served as Stewards. A monitor was randomly chosen in each room after 10
subjects arrived. Monitors received $5, in addition to their $10 show-up fee.
Five sessions consisting of nine pairs of subjects and two monitors were
run for both Group 1 and Group 2. The first session was the “No History”
condition, in which subjects did not receive any financial history from a pre-
vious experimental session. The other four sessions received a financial his-
tory from the immediately preceding experimental session. The Appendix
provides the instructions for both investors and stewards, for both the non-
history and history conditions. Table 1 (Table 2) summarizes the results for
each of the nine pairs of Group 1 (Group 2) subjects in each session.
Materials
Each subject was given a consent form and set of instructions. The consent
form emphasized that (a) participation in the experiment will not affect
participants’ relationship with the University or affect their course grades,
(b) participation is voluntary, (c) all data will remain confidential, and (d)
compensation consists of a payment for showing up plus or minus amounts
sent and received to anonymous counterparts in the experiment. The
instructions were read aloud by the experimenter.
Procedures
The Appendix provides the instructions, including the procedures taken to
assure anonymity and confidentiality. Each subject performed the following
steps:
A. Subjects were randomly assigned to report directly to either Room A or
Room B. One subject in each room was randomly selected to serve as a
monitor (called Monitor A or Monitor B, for Room A and Room B,
respectively). Monitors verified that the experimenters followed the
experimental instructions.
104 XU JIANG ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 P
ro
fe
ss
or
 B
ria
n 
Sh
ap
iro
 A
t 0
7:
04
 2
4 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
(P
T)
B. Subjects read the consent form, were asked questions about the form,
were given an opportunity to ask questions about the form, and then
signed the form if they wished to participate in the experiment.
C. An experimenter in Room A read the experimental instructions out
loud in Room A, and another experimenter in Room B read the
instructions out loud in Room B. Subjects in both rooms were given
hard copies of the instructions and were asked to read along silently.
Toward the end of the instructions, a summary financial history was
given to all but the first generation of players.
D. One at a time, Room A subjects (Investors) were called to a private
area in Room A, were randomly given an envelope containing $10,
opened the envelope, and decided whether to send all, some, or none of
$10 to their Room B counterparts (Stewards). Room A subjects put the
amount of money they wish to send in an envelope and pocketed the
rest. Room A subjects also pocketed a specially marked key to be used
later.
E. After all Room A subjects performed step D, the Room A monitor
took the envelopes to a recorder who was located in a hallway. The
recorder recorded the amount sent and tripled the investment. The
Room B monitor was then called to bring the envelopes to Room B,
and Monitor A returned to Room A.
F. One at a time, Room B subjects were called to a private area in Room
B, were randomly given an envelope, opened the envelope, decided how
much money to send back to their counterpart in Room A, left that
amount of money in the envelope, and pocketed the rest. Afterward,
each Room B subject was paid a $10 show-up fee and was asked to
leave the building.
G. The Room B monitor took the envelopes to the recorder in the hallway.
At this time the amounts sent back were recorded. The Room A moni-
tor was called to put the envelopes into mailboxes marked with letters
corresponding to letters on the envelopes.
H. One at a time, Room A subjects went to Room C and opened the mail-
box with a lettered key corresponding to the letter on mailbox. After
opening the appropriate mailbox, Room A subjects took out the envel-
ope, removed the money, and dropped the key in a box. Afterward,
Room A subjects were paid their $10 show-up fee and were then asked
to leave the building.
I. The monitors were paid $15 for their participation.
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Comparison with Berg et al. (1995)
Besides the difference in subject pools, our experimental setting differs
from the Berg et al. (1995) experiment in one respect. In the investment
games reported in Berg et al. (1995), all subjects were given a $10 show-up
fee. Room A subjects then decided how much of their $10 show-up fee to
send to their anonymous counterpart in Room B, and Room B subjects
pocketed their show-up fee. Our experiment followed the same procedures,
except that Room A subjects also received an additional $10 show-up fee.
RESULTS
Below we report the results for each hypothesis, for Group 1 followed by
Group 2. We also report results where we combine both groups in
footnotes.
Amounts Invested and Returned
Participants in Session I have no history, while participants in Sessions
IIV have financial history because they have access to the results of prior
sessions. H1 predicted that investors would send nonzero amounts to stew-
ards. For Group 1, the average amount invested ranged from $4.67 in
Session I to $7.00 in Session V (Table 1), with an overall average of $5.45.
One-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests indicate that in all five sessions, the
amounts invested differed significantly from zero with a one-sided p-value
<.023. For Group 2, the average amount invested ranged from $5.22 in
Session I to $4.11 in Session V (Table 2), with an overall average of $2.69.
One-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests indicate that in all five sessions, the
amounts invested differed significantly from zero with a one-sided p-value
<.054. These results support H1. As a direct comparison with Berg et al.
(1995), we also compare the amounts sent and returned between Session I
(i.e., the generation without financial history) and Session II (i.e., the
immediate generation that observes financial history). For Group 1, the
average amounts sent for Sessions I and II are $4.67 and $5.22, respec-
tively. For Group 2, the average amounts sent for Sessions I and II are
$5.00 and $2.67, respectively. One-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests indicate
that there is no statistical difference between the amounts sent of the two
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Table 1. Group 1 Amounts Sent and Returned, by Experimental Session.
Session I Session II
Subject pair Sent Returned Subject pair Sent Returned
A 6 0 A 6 9
B 5 10 B 2 1
C 0 0 C 0 0
D 5 0 D 6 3
E 4 0 E 10 12
F 4 4 F 4 5
G 8 16 G 2 1
H 0 0 H 10 5
I 10 0 I 5 15
Averages: $4.67 $4.29 Averages: $5.00 $6.38
Session III Session IV
A 0 0 A 10 0
B 5 8 B 5 8
C 5 10 C 0 0
D 1 1 D 5 10
E 4 5 E 3 0
F 4 0 F 10 21
G 5 8 G 5 15
H 7 7 H 6 5
I 10 15 I 10 8
Averages: $4.56 $6.75 Averages: $6.00 $8.38
Session V
A 5 0
B 5 3
C 5 10
D 10 13
E 10 15
F * *
G 6 9
H 10 20
I 5 5
Averages: $7.00 $9.38
Investor averages include $0 amounts invested. Steward averages exclude observations where
$0 was received.
* Missing data.
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sessions for both groups, although the amount invested appears to be
increasing in Group 1 but decreasing in Group 2. With respect to the
amount returned, the average amounts returned for Sessions I and II are
$4.29 and $5.25, respectively. For Group 2, the average amounts returned
are $6.28 and $2.71, respectively. Again, one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests indicate that there is no statistical difference between the amounts
returned for the two sessions for both groups, although the amount
returned appears to be increasing in Group 1 but decreasing in Group 2.
H2 predicted that stewards who receive nonzero amounts will return
nonzero amounts. Therefore, in order to test H2 we removed observations
where the stewards received $0. In Group 1, the average amounts returned
by stewards for those who received nonzero amounts increased monotoni-
cally from $4.29 in Session I (no history) to $9.38 in Session V (financial
history), with an overall average of $7.04 (Table 1). Excluding cases where
stewards received $0, one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for amounts that
are converted into percentages of the maximum amount that could be
returned yielded one-sided p-values <.023 for all sessions other than
Session I. In Session I, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test yielded a one-sided p-
value of .174. The latter results may be attributed to the relatively large
number of Stewards who received positive amounts but returned $0 in
Session I. In Group 2, however, the average amounts returned by stewards
decreased initially from $5.25 in Session I (no history) to $1.29 in Session
III before rising to $3.76 in Session V, for an overall average of $3.50
(Table 2). Excluding cases where stewards received $0, one-sided Wilcoxon
rank-sum tests for amounts that are converted into percentages of the max-
imum amount that could be returned yielded one-sided p-values <.10 for
Sessions I, IV, and V. For Sessions II and III, however, the one-sided
p-value is .10 and .37, respectively. Overall, the results from Group 1 and
Group 2 support H2, but the Group 2 results are weaker. Again, as a direct
comparison with Berg et al. (1995), we also compare the percentages of the
maximum amount that could be returned between Session I (i.e., the gen-
eration without financial history) and Session II (i.e., the immediate genera-
tion that observes financial history). For Group 1, the average percentage
returned for Sessions I and II are 0.238 and 0.366, respectively. For Group
2, the average percentage returned for Sessions I and II are 0.275 and
0.371, respectively. One-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for both groups
indicate that there is no statistical difference between the percentage of the
amounts sent across the two sessions, although the percentage invested
appears to be increasing in both groups.
108 XU JIANG ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 P
ro
fe
ss
or
 B
ria
n 
Sh
ap
iro
 A
t 0
7:
04
 2
4 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
(P
T)
Table 2. Group 2 Amounts Sent and Returned, by Experimental Session.
Session I Session II
Subject pair Sent Returned Subject pair Sent Returned
A 1 1 A 8 10
B 5 8 B 0 0
C 7 1 C 2 0
D 8 0 D 1 1
E 4 3 E 5 0
F 10 18 F 0 0
G 5 10 G 5 7
H 0 0 H 1 0
I 7 1 I 2 1
Averages: $5.22 $5.25 Averages: $2.67 $2.71
Session III Session IV
A 6 0 A 0 0
B 3 4 B 9 10
C 1 0 C 3 3
D 2 0 D 0 0
E 7 5 E 0 0
F 0 0 F 3 5
G 6 0 G 5 5
H 0 0 H 0 0
I 2 0 I 3 0
Averages: $3.00 $1.29 Averages: $2.56 $4.60
Session V
A 1 1
B 10 10
C 0 0
D 6 0
E 6 0
F 8 8
G 0 0
H 3 3
I 3 4
Averages: $4.11 $3.71
Investor averages include $0 amounts invested. Steward averages exclude observations where
$0 was received.
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Although we did not predict the effect that financial history might have
on the amounts sent and returned, in Group 1 we did observe a successive
increase in the amounts sent by investors in three of the four financial his-
tory conditions, and a successive increase in the amounts returned by
Stewards in all four financial history conditions. These Group 1 results
suggest that financial history can yield socially beneficial outcomes. In
Group 2, however, both the amounts sent and the amounts returned are
largest in Session 1 (No Financial History); the amounts sent and returned
actually decreased in Sessions II and III, and only partly rebounded in
Sessions IV and V. Overall, these results provide mixed evidence that
financial histories can foster socially beneficial outcomes in the Investment
Game setting.
Influence of Financial History on Entropy
Investor Behavior
H3 predicted that the introduction of financial history would reduce the
entropy of amounts sent by investors. Panel A of Table 3 and Panel A of
Table 4 list the number of investors, tabulated by amount invested and
experimental session, for Group 1 and Group 2, respectively. Figs. 1(a)
and (b) display histograms of the amounts invested in each of the experi-
mental sessions for Group 1 and Group 2, respectively. A visual inspec-
tion of Fig. 1(a) indicates that the introduction of a financial history
reduced the variance in the Group 1 amounts invested across the experi-
mental sessions, where the amounts in Session I are more dispersed than
in Session V. More formally, Entropysession I = 2.503 and Entropysession V
= 1.406, indicating a reduction in entropy of 1.098. Fig. 2(a) displays the
Group 1 bootstrapping results for the amounts invested. Based on the
bootstrapped distribution, the observed 1.098 reduction in entropy for
the amounts invested is statistically significant (p < .01, one-tailed). These
Group 1 results support H3, and are consistent with our entropy analysis
of the Berg et al. (1995) data. Again, as a direct comparison with
Berg et al. (1995), we also compared the reduction in entropy for the
amounts invested between Sessions I and II. We have Entropysession I =
2.503 and Entropysession II = 2.503, indicating a reduction in entropy
of 0. Bootstrapping showed that this entropy reduction of 0 is statistically
insignificant. Thus, while Berg et al. (1995) shows that one generation of
financial history is able to reduce entropy, our results indicate that one
generation of financial history may not be enough.
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Similarly, a visual inspection of Fig. 1(b) indicates that the introduction
of a financial history reduced the variance in the Group 2 amounts invested
across the experimental sessions, where the amounts in Session I are more
dispersed than in Session V. More formally, Entropysession I = 2.725 and
Entropysession V = 2.503, indicating a reduction in entropy of 0.222. Fig. 2(b)
displays the Group 2 bootstrapping results for the amounts invested. The
bootstrapped distribution indicates that the observed 0.222 reduction
in entropy for the Group 2 amounts invested is not statistically significant
Table 3. Number of Group 1 Investors, Listed by Experimental Session
and Amounts Sent and Returned.
Panel A. Number of Group 1 investors, by experimental session and amount sent.
Amounts sent Session I Session II Session III Session IV Session V
0 2 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
2 0 2 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 1 0
4 2 1 2 0 0
5 2 1 3 3 4
6 1 2 0 1 1
7 0 0 1 0 0
8 1 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0
10 1 2 1 3 3
Entropy 2.503 2.503 2.419 2.113 1.406
Panel B. Number of Group 1 stewards, by experimental session and amounts returned in
deciles of percentage of amounts received from investors. Observations where investors sent
$0 are excluded.
Deciles of percentage Session I Session II Session III Session IV Session V
0 4 0 1 2 1
(0%, 10%] 0 0 0 0 0
(10%, 20%] 0 4 0 0 1
(20%, 30%] 0 0 0 2 0
(30%, 40%] 1 1 2 0 1
(40%, 50%] 0 2 2 0 3
(50%, 60%] 0 0 2 1 0
(60%, 70%] 2 0 1 2 2
(70%, 80%] 0 0 0 0 0
(80%, 90%] 0 0 0 0 0
(90%, 100%] 0 1 0 1 0
Entropy 1.379 1.750 2.250 2.250 2.156
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at conventional significance levels. In sum, the group 1 results are consis-
tent with H3 and our entropy analysis of the Berg et al. (1995) investor
amounts, but the Group 2 results are mixed and inconclusive.5 Again, as a
direct comparison with Berg et al. (1995), we also compared the reduction
in entropy for the amounts invested between Sessions I and II. We have
Entropysession I = 2.725 and Entropysession II = 2.281, indicating a reduction
in entropy of 0.444. Bootstrapping showed that this entropy reduction of
0.444 is not significant at conventional levels.
Table 4. Number of Group 2 Investors, Listed by Experimental Session
and Amounts Sent and Returned.
Panel A. Number of Group 2 investors, by experimental session and amount sent.
Amounts Sent Session I Session II Session III Session IV Session V
0 3 2 2 4 2
1 2 2 1 0 1
2 0 2 2 0 0
3 1 0 1 3 2
4 3 0 0 0 0
5 2 2 0 1 0
6 3 0 2 0 2
7 1 0 1 0 0
8 1 1 0 0 1
9 0 0 0 1 0
10 1 0 0 0 1
Entropy 2.725 2.281 2.503 1.753 2.503
Panel B. Number of Group 2 stewards, by experimental session and amounts returned in
deciles of percentage of amounts received from investors. Observations where investors sent $0
are excluded.
Deciles of Percentage Session I Session II Session III Session IV Session V
0 1 3 5 1 2
(0%, 10%] 2 0 0 0 0
(10%, 20%] 0 1 0 0 0
(20%, 30%] 1 0 1 0 0
(30%, 40%] 1 1 0 3 4
(40%, 50%] 0 2 1 0 1
(50%, 60%] 2 0 0 1 0
(60%, 70%] 1 0 0 0 0
(70%, 80%] 0 0 0 0 0
(80%, 90%] 0 0 0 0 0
(90%, 100%] 0 0 0 0 0
Entropy 2.5 1.842 1.149 1.371 1.379
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Fig. 1. Amounts Invested in Each of the Five Sessions: (a) Group 1 and (b) Group 2.
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Steward Behavior
H4 predicted that the introduction of financial history would reduce the
entropy of amounts returned by stewards. Since the maximum amounts
returned by stewards were constrained by the tripled amounts sent by
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Fig. 1. (Continued )
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investors, we analyzed the entropy in the distributions of the amounts
returned by Stewards, converted into deciles of percentage of amounts
received from Investors. Panel B of Table 3 and Panel B of Table 4 list the
number of stewards who returned, by deciles of percentages of amounts
received from investors and experimental session, for Group 1 and Group
2, respectively. For Group 1, the average amounts returned by stewards as
a percentage of amounts received from Sessions I to V are 23.8%, 36.6%,
41.45%, 43.1%, and 41.25%, respectively. For Group 2, the average
amounts returned by stewards as a percentage of amounts received from
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(a)
(b)
600
400Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
200
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
–2
–1.0 –0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
–1 0
EntroDifference
EntroDifference
1 2
Fig. 2. Bootstrapped Distribution for Amounts Invested between Sessions I and V:
(a) Group 1 and (b) Group 2.
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Percentage of Amounts Received: (a) Group 1 and (b) Group 2.
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Sessions I to V are 30.98%, 19.76%, 9.75%, 31.85%, and 25.39%, respec-
tively. Fig. 3(a) (Fig. 3(b)) shows histograms of the Group 1 (Group 2)
amounts returned in deciles of amounts received, for each of the five ses-
sions. The Group 1 Steward distributions in Fig. 3(a) do not reveal a trend
2.0
(b)
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
1.5
0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Percentage Returned
Session I
Percentage Returned
Session II
60% 70% 80% 90%100%
0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Percentage Returned
Session III
60% 70% 80% 90%100% 0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Percentage Returned
Session IV
60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Percentage Returned
Session V
60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%100%
1.0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0.5
0.0
5
4
3
2
1
0
4
3
2
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
1
0
Fig. 3. (Continued )
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toward less variance across the five sessions. In contrast, the Group 2
Steward distributions in Fig. 3(b) reveal a trend toward less variance,
though not in a socially beneficial direction, as the average percentage of
amounts returned by stewards generally decreases across sessions.6
More formally, for Group 1, Entropysession I = 1.379 and Entropysession
V = 2.156, indicating a trend toward more entropy (less order). We again
used a bootstrapping technique to determine whether the observed Entropy
difference of 0. 777 is statistically significant. The null hypothesis for this
test is that the returned amounts are chosen randomly. Fig. 4(a) displays
the bootstrapping results for Group 1. Based on this bootstrapped distribu-
tion, Session V has a significantly higher entropy compared to Session I
(one-tailed p < .05).7 This result is contrary to H4 and our entropy analy-
sis of the Berg et al. (1995) Steward distributions. We conjecture that our
result may be attributed to how Group 1 Session I Stewards exhibited
more frequent zero amounts returned. The subsequent greater dispersion
in the amounts returned by Group 1 Stewards in Sessions IIV resulted
in higher entropy, but also indicates that a financial history yielded more
trustworthy stewards. Consistent with this interpretation, Berg et al.
(1995, p. 132) speculated (citing Coleman, 1990) that the provision of a
financial history might enable Stewards to more easily identify with other
investment game participants, and thus trigger internalized social norms
of trustworthiness. As a direct comparison with Berg et al. (1995), we
also compared the reduction in entropy for the amounts invested between
Sessions I and II. We have Entropysession I = 1.379 and Entropysession II =
1.75, indicating an increase in entropy of 0.371. Bootstrapping showed
that this entropy reduction of 0.371 is not significant at conventional
levels.
In contrast, for Group 2, Entropysession I = 2.500 and Entropysession V =
1.379, indicating a trend toward less entropy (more order). We again used
a bootstrapping technique to determine whether the observed Entropy dif-
ference of 1.121 is statistically significant. The null hypothesis for this test
is that the returned amounts are chosen randomly. Fig. 4(b) displays the
bootstrapping results for Group 2. Based on this bootstrapped distribution,
Session V has a significantly lower entropy than Session I (p < .01, one-
tailed).8 These Group 2 results are consistent with H4 and our entropy
analysis of the Berg et al. (1995) Steward distributions. In addition, when
combined with the observation that the percentage of amounts returned by
steward decreased as more financial history was revealed, it appears that
the provision of a financial history enabled stewards to more easily identify
whether other investment game participants were trustworthy or not.
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Specifically, the financial history based on Group 2 Session I may have led
Group 2 Session II stewards to infer a social norm whereby most partici-
pants are not expected to be trustworthy, and consequently more of them
returned zero even when they received positive amounts from investors.
Overall, however, the Group 1 and Group 2 results provide mixed support
for H4’s prediction that financial history would reduce the entropy in the
amounts returned by Stewards.9 As a direct comparison with Berg et al.
(1995), we also compared the reduction in entropy for the amounts
invested between Sessions I and II. We have Entropysession I = 2.500 and
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Fig. 4. Bootstrapped Distribution for Percentage Amounts Returned between
Sessions I and V: (a) Group 1 and (b) Group 2.
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Entropysession II = 1.842, indicating an increase in entropy of 0.658.
Bootstrapping showed that this entropy reduction of 0.658 is marginally
significant (p < .1, one-tailed).
Joint Test of Investor/Steward Behavior
We now examine the joint densities of Investor and Steward behavior to
test whether the observed clustering is statistically significant, as predicted
by H5. Since each session has the same sample size of 9, the effect of sam-
ple size on the entropy metric does not arise in our setting. The entropy for-
mula is as follows:
−
X
i
X
j
fi; j
N
log2
fi; j
N
where fij denotes the frequency in category “i; j.” For example, “3,2”
denotes 3 dollars invested and 2 returned by the steward and N represents
the number of sample observations. Under this metric for Group 1,
Entropysession I = 2.948 and Entropysession V = 2.750. Our bootstrapped dis-
tribution indicates that the 0.198 reduction in entropy in the Group I joint
Investor/Steward distributions from Session I to V is not significant (one-
tailed p > .4). The results for Group 2 and a combination of Group 1 and
Group 2 are qualitatively similar. As a direct comparison with Berg et al.
(1995), we also compared the reduction in entropy for the amounts invested
between our Sessions I and II. Again, the results are not statistically signifi-
cant. Altogether, these results do not support H5, and are contrary to the
marginally significant reduction in entropy we observed from Session I to
Session II in the Berg et al. (1995) joint distributions (Table 5; Fig. 5).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We used the Berg et al. (1995) data to show that a report summarizing the
financial transactions of a previous experimental session significantly
reduced entropy in the amounts sent by Investors and returned by
Stewards, and marginally reduced the entropy in the joint distribution of
amounts invested and returned. We then sought to replicate these Berg
et al. (1995) findings as well as extend their study by investigating whether
financial histories will further reduce entropy over subsequent generations.
More specifically, we investigated whether the provision of financial
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transaction history from preceding generations will enable successive gen-
erations of a laboratory society to increasingly organize themselves over
time. We operationally defined an increase in organization as a reduction
in entropy of the distributions of amounts invested and returned in an
investment game. To test the predictive power of our main hypothesis that
financial histories over successive generations will enable the emergence of
increasing societal order, we gathered new data from two groups (Group 1
and Group 2) over five societal generations.
Table 5. Number of Investors in Group 1 and Group 2 Combined, Listed
by Experimental Session and Amounts Sent and Returned.
Panel A. Number of investors in both groups, by experimental session and amount sent.
Amounts Sent Session I Session II Session III Session IV Session V
0 1 3 3 5 2
1 1 2 2 0 1
2 0 4 2 0 0
3 0 0 1 4 2
4 1 1 2 0 0
5 2 3 3 4 4
6 0 2 2 1 3
7 2 0 2 0 0
8 1 1 0 0 1
9 0 0 0 1 0
10 1 2 1 3 4
Entropy 3.01307 2.86383 3.08605 2.3719 2.63129
Panel B. Number of stewards in Group 1 and Group 2 combined, listed by experimental
session and amounts returned in deciles of percentage of amounts received from investors.
Observations where investors sent $0 are excluded.
Deciles of Percentage Session I Session II Session III Session IV Session V
0 5 3 6 3 3
(0%, 10%] 2 0 0 0 0
(10%, 20%] 0 5 0 0 1
(20%, 30%] 1 0 1 2 0
(30%, 40%] 2 2 2 3 5
(40%, 50%] 0 4 3 0 4
(50%, 60%] 2 0 2 2 0
(60%, 70%] 3 0 1 2 2
(70%, 80%] 0 0 0 0 0
(80%, 90%] 0 0 0 0 0
(90%, 100%] 0 1 0 1 0
Entropy 2.41592 2.14926 2.28925 2.50738 2.14926
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If we assume that all agents are myopically self-interested and believe
that all other agents are similarly self-interested, then each Investor and
Steward should “take the money and run,” leaving no role for financial his-
tory in the evolution of society. In order for financial history to play a role
in our experimental setting, the assumption of myopic self-interest needs to
be relaxed. For example, if each Investor is myopically self-interested but
believes that his or her partner might not be, then a financial history of
past Investor/Steward behavior can tell Investors something about the
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Fig. 5. Bootstrapped Distribution for the Joint Behavior between Sessions I and V:
(a) Group 1 and (b) Group 2.
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likely amount returned for each amount invested. Thus, financial histories
might influence the amounts invested, and if Stewards are not myopically
self-interested, financial histories might also give Stewards a basis to infer
and mimic expected or acceptable behavior.
Consistent with the prior investment game literature and our H1, our
bootstrap analyses indicate that the distributions of amounts sent by
Investors in all five sessions for both Group 1 and Group 2 differed signifi-
cantly from zero. Similarly, the distributions of amounts returned by
Stewards generally supported our H2 but the results were more mixed.
Specifically, the distributions of amounts returned by Stewards were signifi-
cantly greater than zero for four of five Group 1 Sessions and three of five
Group 2 sessions.
Overall, however, the pattern of results across our study and the Berg
et al. (1995) study indicates that the impact of financial history on entropy
reduction is not as robust as initially thought. More specifically, consistent
with our H3, our bootstrap analyses indicate that financial history gener-
ally reduced the entropy in the amounts sent by Investors across the five
sessions, with stronger results for Group 1 than for Group 2. In contrast,
we found mixed support for a reduction in entropy in the amounts returned
by Stewards (H4). Specifically, the entropy in the Group 2 Session V
amounts returned by Stewards was significantly lower than the entropy in
the Group 2 Session I amounts, as predicted by our H4, but the entropy
in the Group 1 Session V amounts returned by Stewards was higher rather
than lower than the entropy in the Group 1 Session I amounts. Finally, our
analyses did not support our H5 prediction that financial history would
reduce entropy in the joint Investor/Steward distributions. The combined
entropy results for H3H5 yielded a similar pattern. Clearly, more research
is needed to document the potential mediating effects of financial history
across a variety of conditions. Below, we discuss several opportunities for
future research.
First, along with Berg et al. (1995), we conjectured that the provision of
a financial history might enable stewards to more easily identify whether
other Investment Game stewards are trustworthy. This suggests that the
impact of financial history may depend on initial conditions and is path
dependent. For example, if financial histories indicate that past stewards
tended to be trustworthy, current and future stewards might internalize
social norms of trustworthiness and consequently tend to act in a more
trustworthy manner. Likewise, current and future investors might interna-
lize social norms of trusting behavior and consequently be willing to invest
more. The opposite Investor and Steward patterns may emerge if financial
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histories indicate that stewards tend to return zero or very low amounts. A
larger set of experiments would be required to formally test how initial con-
ditions and other path dependencies might interact with financial histories.
Second, entropy reduction is only one of several possible social out-
comes that could be mediated by financial histories. Indeed, as we observed
in our data, it is possible for financial histories to yield more disperse but
also more trustworthy Stewardship distributions, or instead yield less
diverse but also less trustworthy Stewardship distributions. For example,
an emergent increase in Stewardship trustworthiness might in turn yield
more trusting Investors over subsequent generations. These iterative effects
could ultimately yield greater overall social wealth, despite higher entropy
in the amounts returned by Stewards. On the other hand, if Investment
Game participants tend to distrust each other in the beginning, financial
histories might shape participants’ perceptions of other people and thereby
augment their distrust. This would in turn yield lower entropy but lower
total social wealth as the investors send and stewards return lower
amounts. Again, a larger set of experiments would be required to examine
these potential effects.
Third, variations of the Investment Game could be used to test the incre-
mental effects of financial history when Investors and Stewards participate
in multiple sessions and are allowed to communicate with one another (cf.
Charness, Duh, & Yang, 2011; Chaudhuri et al., 2009), or when social dis-
tance between the experimenter and subjects is varied (cf. Cox & Deck,
2005; who found more positively reciprocal behavior in the Trust Game
when the experimenter had personal knowledge of subjects’ behavior).
Fourth, Ortmann et al. (2000) found that the amounts invested by inves-
tors in the Investment Game were robust to whether the investors com-
pleted a questionnaire to prompt their strategic reasoning about stewards’
likely behavior, and whether the social history was presented in table form
only or in tables plus graphs. Future research could test whether such mod-
ifications will influence the amounts returned by stewards and stewards’
strategic reasoning about investor behavior. But more generally, the
Johnson and Mislin (2011) meta-analysis of investment game studies found
mixed results from prior studies that engaged subjects to think strategically
through the various behavioral implications of each possible outcome. This
suggests that the effect of conscious strategies may be highly contingent on
other factors that remain to be identified and experimentally controlled.
Finally, although the reporting of financial histories can be a conscious
strategy that societal agents use to structure their economic and social
environments, they also can have unintended effects on organizations and
124 XU JIANG ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 P
ro
fe
ss
or
 B
ria
n 
Sh
ap
iro
 A
t 0
7:
04
 2
4 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
(P
T)
societies, as has been found in other measurement systems (Burchell,
Clubb, Hopwood, Hughes, & Nahapiet, 1980; Cyert & March, 1992;
Thompson, 1967). While the effects of financial histories might in some cir-
cumstances be mediated by the conscious strategies of individual agents
(cf. Berg et al., 1995, p. 134), financial histories also might structure the
behavior of subsequent generations without necessarily requiring agents to
be consciously aware of these effects (cf. Giddens, 1984). More research
is needed to ascertain the extent to which the effect of financial history
is mediated by conscious versus unconscious individual perceptions and
decision strategies.
NOTES
1. Ortmann et al.’s (2000) study of the Investment Game reported that the
amounts invested were robust to whether the Investors completed a questionnaire
designed to prompt strategic reasoning, and to changes in how the social history
information was presented to subjects (e.g., in tables only as in Berg et al. (1995) or
in tables accompanied by graphs that showed the proportional amounts returned
by stewards).
2. Specifically, when the probability of heads is 0.75, the entropy is calculated as
− 0:75logað0:75Þ− 0:25logað0:25Þ where a is the base of the logarithm. The result is
approximately 0.81 when the binary logarithm (log base 2) is used. If we had instead
calculated entropy with the natural logarithm (log base e), the result would have
been approximately 0.56. The choice of base affects the absolute value of the
entropy measure but it does not affect the comparison of entropy measures when all
of the measures are calculated using the same base. All of our entropy calculations
use the binary logarithm.
3. Note that variance captures the same construct as entropy in a normal distri-
bution. For non-normal distributions, however, entropy has been shown to be a
better measure of uncertainty than variance. Nevertheless, we also conducted a var-
iance analysis with qualitatively similar results.
4. Specifically, in the No History condition there are at most 32 distinct observa-
tions. This means the maximum level of entropy will be −log2(1/32) = 5.0. In
contrast, if there were only 28 observations, the maximum entropy would be
−log2(1/28) = 4.8.
5. Combining data from both Group 1 and Group 2, Entropysession I = 3.013 and
Entropysession V = 2.631, indicating a marginally significant (p = .10, one-tailed)
reduction in entropy of 0.382.
6. Note that while a scenario where all stewards return 100% or all stewards
return 0% will generate the least amount of entropy, the former is socially beneficial
whereas the latter is not.
7. Pairwise entropy differences between Group 1 Sessions II and V are not signif-
icant at conventional levels.
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8. Pairwise entropy differences between Group 1 Sessions II and V are not signif-
icant at conventional levels.
9. Combining data from both Group 1 and Group 2, Entropysession I = 2.416 and
Entropysession V = 2.149. Session V has lower entropy, but a bootstrapping test indi-
cates that the difference of 0.267 is not significant at conventional levels.
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APPENDIX
Instructions for Room A
You have been asked to participate in a decision-making study. I will read
these instructions out loud. Please do not talk among yourselves. If you
have any questions, please raise your hand. I will then answer your ques-
tions individually.
Overview
In this experiment each of you will be paired with a different participant
who is in another room. You will not be told who these people are either
during or after the experiment. This is Room A. Other participants are in
Room B. You will notice that there are other people in the same room with
you who are also participating in this experiment. You will not be paired
with any of these people.
One participant in Room A will be called Monitor A, and one partici-
pant in Room B will be called Monitor B. Monitor A and Monitor B will
be randomly chosen before the experiment begins. The monitors will be in
charge of the envelopes as explained below. The monitors also will verify
that the instructions have been followed. Monitors will be given $15 at the
end of the experiment.
Each participant in Room B who is not a monitor will be given $10 for
showing up on time and participating until the end of the experiment. Each
participant in Room A will receive $10 in an envelope. Each Room A parti-
cipant will then have the opportunity to send some, all, or none of the $10
to a participant in Room B. Each dollar sent to Room B will be tripled.
For example, if a participant in Room A sends an envelope containing $2,
he or she will keep the remaining $8 and the envelope will contain $6 when
it reaches Room B. If a participant in Room A sends an envelope contain-
ing $9, he or she will keep the remaining $1 and the envelope will contain
$27 when it reaches Room B. The participant in Room B will then decide
how much money to send back to the participant in Room A.
(For the financial history treatment we added the following paragraph:
Each of you has received a report summarizing the decisions of subjects
who participated in a previous experiment. Please check the last page of the
instructions to be sure you have this sheet.)
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Confidentiality
This experiment is designed so that no one, including the experimenters
and monitors, will know the decisions of any individual participants in
Room A or Room B. Since your decision is private, we ask that you do not
tell anyone your decision either during or after the experiment.
How the Experiment is Run
Room A Participant Decisions. The experiment is conducted as follows.
Ten large unmarked envelopes have been placed in a box in Room A. Each
of these envelopes contains 10 one dollar bills, a smaller inner envelope,
and a key in a sealed envelope marked “KEY.” The inner envelope and
key are both marked with the same letter of the alphabet. The Room A
monitor will randomly select and hand each participant in Room A an
unmarked envelope from the box. Each Room A participant will perform
the following steps:
1. Privately open the unmarked envelope. The participant who opens the
envelope will be the only person who knows which letter of the alphabet
was in the envelope.
2. Leave the envelope marked “KEY” unopened until instructed to open it
later in the experiment.
3. Privately decide how many dollar bills to put into the inner envelope,
and then put those dollar bills in the inner envelope.
4. Privately pocket any remaining dollar bills and pocket the unopened
envelope marked “KEY.”
5. Privately put the inner envelope back inside the large unmarked
envelope.
6. Raise his or her hand. When Monitor A comes by, return the unmarked
envelope to the box marked “return the envelopes here.”
Recording and Processing of Room A Envelopes. As soon as all Room A
envelopes have been put into the return box, Monitor A will transport the
box to a recorder who is sitting in the hallway. With Monitor A observing,
the recorder will perform the following steps:
1. Take all unmarked envelopes out of the box.
2. Take an inner envelope out of an unmarked envelope, one at a time.
3. On a blank sheet of paper, record the letter that is printed on the envel-
ope and the amount of money in the envelope.
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4. Triple the amount of money in the inner envelope, place the inner envel-
ope back into the unmarked outer envelope, and place the unmarked
outer envelope back in the box.
5. After all of the envelopes have been processed in this manner, the recor-
der will signal Monitor B to come to the recorder’s desk. Once Monitor
B has arrived, Monitor A will be asked to return to Room A.
Room B Participant Decisions. Monitor B will carry the box of envelopes
to Room B. Monitor B then will randomly select and hand each participant
in Room B an unmarked envelope from the box. Each Room B participant
will perform the following steps:
1. Decide how many dollar bills to leave in the inner envelope.
2. Pocket any remaining dollar bills.
3. Place the inner envelope in the unmarked outer envelope.
4. Raise his or her hand. When Monitor B comes by, return the outer
envelope to the box marked “return envelopes here.”
5. Gather his or her belongings, receive his or her $10 compensation for
participating in the experiment, and be asked to leave the building.
Recording and Processing of Room B Envelopes. After all envelopes in
Room B are returned to the box marked “return the envelopes here” and
all Room B participants have been asked to leave the building, Monitor B
will transport the box to the recorder in the hallway. With Monitor B
observing, the recorder will perform the following steps:
1. Take all unmarked envelopes out of the box.
2. Take an inner envelope out of an unmarked envelope, one at a time.
3. Record on a blank sheet of paper the letter on the envelope and the
amount of money in the envelope.
4. Place the inner envelope in the box.
5. After all of the envelopes have been processed in this manner, the recor-
der will then signal Monitor A to come to the recorder’s desk.
Once Monitor A has arrived, Monitor B will return to Room B. When
Monitor A arrives, Monitor A and the recorder will carry the box of envel-
opes to Room C. Room C contains locking boxes with identifying letters.
The letters correspond to the letters on the inner envelopes. While the
recorder observes, Monitor A will place each inner envelope in the box
with the corresponding letter. All of the boxes will then be locked. The
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recorder will then return to the hallway and Monitor A will return to
Room A.
Room A Participants Privately Open the Returned Envelopes. Monitor A
will then point to one participant in Room A at a time to proceed to Room
C. When called to go to Room C, each Room A participant will perform
the following steps:
1. Gather all of his or her belongings since he or she will be asked to leave
the building when done.
2. Enter Room C alone.
3. Open the envelope marked “KEY.” Inside this envelope is a lettered key
which will open the locked box with the corresponding letter. The inner
envelope in the box is the same envelope that Room A participant
started with.
4. Go to the appropriate locked box, open it, take out the envelope, and
remove the money.
5. Return the empty envelope to the box.
6. Lock the box.
7. Return the key to the envelope marked “KEY.”
8. Drop the envelope marked “KEY” in the box just outside the door in
the hallway and be asked to leave the building.
Conclusion of Experiment. After everyone in Room A has left, the experi-
ment is over and the two monitors will be paid $15 for their participation.
Note about Dollar Bills. We will use e-dollars for this experiment.
At the end of the experiment, your e-dollars will be converted into
real dollars at a faceless teller. The conversion rate is one dollar for one
e-dollar bill.
Instructions for Room B
You have been asked to participate in a decision-making study. I will read
these instructions out loud. Please do not talk among yourselves. If you
have any questions, please raise your hand. I will then answer your ques-
tions individually.
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Overview
In this experiment each of you will be paired with a different participant
who is in another room. You will not be told who these people are either
during or after the experiment. This is Room B. Other participants are in
Room A. You will notice that there are other people in the same room
with you who are also participating in this experiment. You will not be
paired with any of these people.
One participant in Room A will be called Monitor A, and one partici-
pant in Room B will be called Monitor B. Monitor A and Monitor B will
be randomly chosen before the experiment begins. The monitors will be in
charge of the envelopes as explained below. The monitors also will verify
that the instructions have been followed. Monitors will be given $15 at the
end of the experiment.
Each participant in Room B who is not a monitor will be given $10 for
showing up on time and participating until the end of the experiment. Each
participant in Room A will receive $10 in an envelope. Each Room A parti-
cipant will then have the opportunity to send some, all, or none of the $10
to a participant in Room B. Each dollar sent to Room B will be tripled.
For example, if a participant in Room A sends an envelope containing $2,
he or she will keep the remaining $8 and the envelope will contain $6 when
it reaches Room B. If a participant in Room A sends an envelope contain-
ing $9, he or she will keep the remaining $1 and the envelope will contain
$27 when it reaches Room B. The participant in Room B will then decide
how much money to send back to the participant in Room A.
(For the financial history treatment we added the following paragraph:
Each of you has received a report summarizing the decisions of subjects
who participated in a previous experiment. Please check the last page of the
instructions to be sure you have this sheet.)
Confidentiality
This experiment is designed so that no one, including the experimenters
and monitors, will know the decisions of any individual participants in
Room A or Room B. Since your decision is private, we ask that you do not
tell anyone your decision either during or after the experiment.
How the Experiment is Run
Room A Participant Decisions. The experiment is conducted as follows.
Twelve large unmarked envelopes have been placed in a box in Room A.
Each of these envelopes contains 10 one dollar bills, a smaller inner envel-
ope, and a key in a sealed envelope marked “KEY.” The inner envelope
132 XU JIANG ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 P
ro
fe
ss
or
 B
ria
n 
Sh
ap
iro
 A
t 0
7:
04
 2
4 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
(P
T)
and key are both marked with the same letter of the alphabet. The Room
A monitor will randomly select and hand each participant in Room A an
unmarked envelope from the box. Each Room A participant will perform
the following steps:
1. Privately open the unmarked envelope. The participant who opens the
envelope will be the only person who knows which letter of the alphabet
was in the envelope.
2. Leave the envelope marked “KEY” unopened until instructed to open it
later in the experiment.
3. Privately decide how many dollar bills to put into the inner envelope,
and then put those dollar bills in the inner envelope.
4. Privately pocket any remaining dollar bills and pocket the unopened
envelope marked “KEY.”
5. Privately put the inner envelope back inside the large unmarked envelope.
6. Raise his or her hand. When Monitor A comes by, return the unmarked
envelope to the box marked “return the envelopes here.”
Recording and Processing of Room A Envelopes. As soon as all Room A
envelopes have been put into the return box, Monitor A will transport the
box to a recorder who is sitting in the hallway. With Monitor A observing,
the recorder will perform the following steps:
1. Take all unmarked envelopes out of the box.
2. Take an inner envelope out of an unmarked envelope, one at a time.
3. On a blank sheet of paper, record the letter that is printed on the envel-
ope and the amount of money in the envelope.
4. Triple the amount of money in the inner envelope, place the inner envel-
ope back into the unmarked outer envelope, and place the unmarked
outer envelope back in the box.
5. After all of the envelopes have been processed in this manner, the recor-
der will signal Monitor B to come to the recorder’s desk. Once Monitor
B has arrived, Monitor A will be asked to return to Room A.
Room B Participant Decisions. Monitor B will carry the box of envelopes
to Room B. Monitor B then will randomly select and hand each participant
in Room B an unmarked envelope from the box. Each Room B participant
will perform the following steps:
1. Decide how many dollar bills to leave in the inner envelope.
2. Pocket any remaining dollar bills.
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3. Place the inner envelope in the unmarked outer envelope.
4. Raise his or her hand. When Monitor B comes by, return the outer
envelope to the box marked “return envelopes here.”
5. Gather his or her belongings, receive his or her $10 compensation for
participating in the experiment, and be asked to leave the building.
Recording and Processing of Room B Envelopes. After all envelopes in
Room B are returned to the box marked “return the envelopes here” and
all Room B participants have been asked to leave the building, Monitor B
will transport the box to the recorder in the hallway. With Monitor B
observing, the recorder will perform the following steps:
1. Take all unmarked envelopes out of the box.
2. Take an inner envelope out of an unmarked envelope, one at a time.
3. Record on a blank sheet of paper the letter on the envelope and the
amount of money in the envelope.
4. Place the inner envelope in the box.
5. After all of the envelopes have been processed in this manner, the recor-
der will then signal Monitor A to come to the recorder’s desk.
Once Monitor A has arrived, Monitor B will return to Room B. When
Monitor A arrives, Monitor A and the recorder will carry the box of envel-
opes to room C. Room C contains locking boxes with identifying letters.
The letters correspond to the letters on the inner envelopes. While the
recorder observes, Monitor A will place each inner envelope in the box
with the corresponding letter. All of the boxes will then be locked. The
recorder will then return to the hallway and Monitor A will return to
Room A.
Room A Participants Privately Open the Returned Envelopes. Monitor A
will then point to one participant in Room A at a time to proceed to Room
C. When called to go to Room C, each Room A participant will perform
the following steps:
1. Gather all of his or her belongings since he or she will be asked to leave
the building when done.
2. Enter Room C alone.
3. Open the envelope marked “KEY.” Inside this envelope is a lettered key
which will open the locked box with the corresponding letter. The inner
envelope in the box is the same envelope that Room A participant
started with.
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4. Go to the appropriate locked box, open it, take out the envelope, and
remove the money.
5. Return the empty envelope to the box.
6. Lock the box.
7. Return the key to the envelope marked “KEY.”
8. Drop the envelope marked “KEY” in the box just outside the door in
the hallway, receive his or her $10 compensation for participating in the
experiment and be asked to leave the building.
Conclusion of Experiment. After everyone in Room A has left, the experi-
ment is over and the two monitors will be paid $15 for their participation.
Note about Dollar Bills. We will use e-dollars for this experiment. At the
end of the experiment, your e-dollars will be converted into real dollars at a
faceless teller. The conversion rate is one dollar for one e-dollar.
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